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ABSTRACT 
In the context of immigration, words matter. The increasingly used 
term “criminal alien” is not only used as an adjective to define a 
noncitizen who has committed a crime, but it also acts as a descrip-
tion of his or her personhood. The use of the term “illegals,” which is 
the shortened version of “illegal alien,” is pervasive in the media as 
well as policy debate. In Part I, this paper discusses the evolution of 
the immigration system in the United States from a discretionary and 
humanitarian system to a criminalized process. In Part II, this paper 
examines the convergence of the criminal and immigration systems, 
as well as the dehumanization of its participants. In Part III, this pa-
per addresses the impact of immigration status and consequences in 
the practice of criminal defense following the landmark decision, Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky.1 Additionally, the author draws on her experience 
as a public defender and immigration resource attorney in Virginia 
to discuss the impact of “crimmigration” policies. Ultimately, this 
article suggests replacing inaccurate and inflammatory identifiers 
with precise and non-pejorative language in both policy and public 
discourse as a first step away from crimmigration. This article utiliz-
es and encourages use of the term “noncitizen” to describe any per-
son in the U.S. without citizenship, with more status-specific terms 
when relevant.  
INTRODUCTION 
Criminal: “relating to, involving, or being a crime”2 or “morally 
wrong.”3 
Illegal: “not according to or authorized by law: unlawful, illicit.”4 
Alien: “differing in nature or character typically to the point of incompat-
                                               
1 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
2 Criminal, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2017), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/criminal. 
3 Id. 
4 Illegal, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2017), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/illegal. 
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ibility,”5 or “a creature that comes from somewhere other than the planet 
Earth,”6 and in the legal context, “any person not a citizen or national of the 
United States.”7 
In the context of the immigration debate and definitional terms, most 
people do not confuse noncitizens with the second definition of alien, crea-
tures from a planet other than Earth, but the implication of division is clear. 
The separation between “us” and “them” is accentuated by using these 
terms. Further, “criminal/illegal alien” conflates morally wrong or illicit be-
havior with a person who is foreign and different. Similarly, the term “ille-
gal aliens,” used colloquially to mean noncitizens that are in the United 
States without proper documentation, is often shortened and personalized 
by the media, simply calling people “illegals.” The term “criminal alien” 
formally refers only to those noncitizens with criminal convictions, but in 
colloquial usage, the term paints much more broadly and sounds strikingly 
menacing. 
Social sciences have long recognized the importance in how society re-
fers to people or groups. For example, the “People First Language” move-
ment, which began as an advocacy movement, encourages the use of terms 
such as “person with an intellectual disability” rather than “mentally retard-
ed.”8 As stated by The Arc, a national advocacy group for people with intel-
lectual and developmental disabilities, “Our words and the meanings we at-
tach to them create attitudes, drive social policies and laws, influence our 
feelings and decisions, and affect people’s daily lives and more. How we 
use them makes a difference.”9 This concept—that the way we as a society 
define people and social groups impacts the rights of those so defined—has 
broad policy implications and transfers into the legal lexicon. As pointed 
out in the context of the civil rights movement, “Words are powerful; old, 
inaccurate, and inappropriate descriptors perpetuate negative stereotypes 
and attitudinal barriers.”10  
This article tackles how such terms dehumanize those noncitizens who 
are caught up in the increasingly criminalized immigration system. The im-
pact, both in policy and public opinion, of deeming a person rather than an 
                                               
5 Alien, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2017), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/alien 
(second adjective definition). 
6 Id. (definition for English learners). 
7 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). 
8 Kate Sablosky Elengold, Branding Identity, 93 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2015) (delving into racial la-
bels and their impact in the civil rights movement). 
9 What is People First Language?, THE ARC (2016), http://www.thearc.org/who-we-are/media-
center/people-first-language. 
10 Elengold, supra note 8, at 36 (quoting The Arc). 
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action to be illegal has enabled the creation of “crimmigration.”11 Crimmi-
gration refers to the conflagration of the immigration and criminal systems 
wherein immigration status is incorporated into the criminal system in addi-
tion to the importation of criminal justice norms and procedures into the 
immigration system, or the “criminalization” of the immigration system.  
Part I explains how the historical rise in criminal offenses for immigra-
tion violations, coupled with the vast expansion of immigration conse-
quences for criminal acts, created a duplicative crimmigration system with 
all of the penal consequences and none of the protections offered by the 
criminal justice system in the United States. Part II emphasizes collabora-
tion between the local and federal authorities in order to share information 
and apprehend noncitizens by examining data revealing how the two sys-
tems became intertwined over time. Part III explains the impact of crimmi-
gration on criminal defense of immigrants, specifically in Virginia. It also 
revisits the marginalization of noncitizens bolstered by terms such as “ille-
gal alien.” 
I. CRIMMIGRATION: A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM  
A. The Institutional Evolution of Crimmigration and the False Distinction 
between Civil and Criminal Proceedings 
The historical blurring of the lines between the immigration and criminal 
systems is the subject of much academic research, and it is not the purpose 
of this article to rehash those arguments. However, it is necessary to pro-
vide the evolution of this confluence to elucidate how the dehumanization 
of the noncitizen enabled crimmigration to occur. Historically, the immigra-
tion policy in the United States derived from the sovereign power of the na-
tion as a matter of international policy.12 Notably, in 1893, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that “‘[d]eportation’ is the removal of an alien out of the 
country, simply because his presence is deemed inconsistent with the public 
welfare, and without any punishment being imposed or contemplated,” and 
therefore, “the order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.”13 Early 
in the country’s history, the federal government did not actively seek to ex-
                                               
11 See Juliet Strumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. 
L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). 
12 César Cuauhtémoc Garcia Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1346, 1351–52 (2014); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893). 
13 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 709. 
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pel noncitizens convicted of crimes after their arrival.14 Rather, it used the 
deportation process to expel those who “were not supposed to have been 
admitted in the first place,” analogous to “a voidable contract.”15 In fact, it 
was not until 1917 that the government broadened the basis for removal 
proceedings to include noncitizens convicted of crimes.16 
By the mid-1900s, the immigration system expanded, as did the sanc-
tioned use of detention to effectuate the deportation process.17 In 1950, the 
United States Supreme Court was called upon to answer the question: “[un-
der the Internal Security Act of 1950] may the Attorney General, as the ex-
ecutive head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, after taking in-
to custody active alien Communists on warrants . . . continue them in 
custody without bail, at his discretion pending determination as to their de-
portability.”18 The Court elaborated that “[d]eportation is not a criminal 
proceeding and has never been held to be punishment.”19 It continued, “No 
jury sits. No judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution,” and there-
fore, the 1950 Act placed discretion to detain aliens without bail in the At-
torney General.20 The Court answered the initial question in the affirmative, 
allowing noncitizens to be detained for non-criminal matters, continuing 
longstanding precedent that such proceedings are civil in nature and not 
considered punishment, despite allowing for incarceration prior to remov-
al.21 
In 2001, in a decision challenging the use of indefinite detention for 
noncitizens after a removal order, the Supreme Court held, “the proceedings 
at issue here are civil, not criminal, and we assume that they are nonpuni-
tive in purpose and effect.”22 This case affirmed almost a century of litiga-
tion, and concluded, without much analysis beyond reliance on precedent, 
that immigration proceedings are civil in nature despite their outwardly pu-
nitive result.23 As previously summarized, it was considered “civil con-
finement because it is part of a civil proceeding to determine whether a civil 
sanction is meted out,”24 without any regard or concern for changing poli-
                                               
14 Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal 
Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 487 (2007). 
15 Id. 
16 Strumpf, supra note 11, at 376 (referencing GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: 
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 22 (1996). 
17 Hernández, supra note 12, at 1355. 
18 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 526–28 (1952). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 537. 
21 Id. at 537–39, 542. 
22 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 
23 Hernández, supra note 12, at 1353–55; Legomsky, supra note 14, at 512. 
24 Hernández, supra note 12, at 1352 (citing Dona Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for 
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cies and use of detention over the last century. These cases enabled viola-
tions of civil immigration laws to result in detention based on the theory 
that such confinement is not punishment.  
In neglecting to realize the human cost of these stripped rights, the cases 
instead focus on an antiquated differentiation between the two systems that 
no longer exists. These cases were integral to the rise in criminal-type con-
sequences for civil immigration infractions, to include detention and further 
limiting noncitizens rights.25 However, simply repeating that conclusion 
does not absolve the justice system of properly recognizing those within its 
grasp.  Instead, this distinction allowed for the criminalization of the immi-
gration system without the constitutional protections present in a criminal 
proceeding.26  
The logic of this distinction is flimsy at best. As pointed out by previous 
authors, blindly defining the immigration enforcement system as a civil 
regulatory system ignores the characteristics it shares with criminal pun-
ishment.27 Incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and banishment are all 
common goals of the criminal justice system.28 Further, “[p]robably nothing 
distinguishes criminal and civil proceedings more sharply than the threat of 
incarceration, not only at the end of the process, but often while the process 
is ongoing. Jailing people the government was trying to deport used to be 
unusual, but it has become commonplace.”29 Long before the rise in crim-
migration, even a Supreme Court justice recognized the severity of immi-
gration consequences, albeit in dissent, “deportation is equivalent to ban-
ishment or exile. Deportation proceedings technically are not criminal; but 
practically they are for they extend the criminal process of sentencing to in-
clude on the same convictions an additional punishment of deportation.”30  
Thus, this legal partition is consistently and repeatedly invoked to fore-
close constitutional rights to respondents in an immigration proceeding, 
which include the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, privilege against self-
                                                                                                             
Criminal Inmates and Immigrant Detainees, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2001) (“Immigration 
proceedings are conducted exclusively in civil courts, and immigration detention is not a form of pun-
ishment.”). 
25 See Legomsky, supra note 14, at 487 (“Today, one may be removed from the United States for enter-
ing the country while within one of the inadmissible classes or for entering without inspection or by 
fraud.”). 
26 See id. at 515. 
27 Id. at 514; Hernández, supra note 12, at 1352–53. 
28 Legomsky, supra note 14, at 514; Hernández, supra note 12, at 1352–53. 
29 David A. Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 
181–82 (2012). 
30 Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as a Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Immigration Status and the 
Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1454 (2011) (quoting Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 
243 (1951) (Jackson J., dissenting)). 
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incrimination, and Fourth Amendment evidentiary protections.31 Converse-
ly, the lack of the right to counsel in immigration proceedings is codified, 
and states “the alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no ex-
pense to the government.”32 This “privilege” is an empty promise for an in-
digent person facing the immigration system who cannot afford to pay for 
an attorney. This is similar to the “privilege” to hire an attorney as an indi-
gent person in the criminal context, which was held to be an empty promise 
without counsel being paid for by the court.33   
Another constitutional right afforded to criminal defendants that is absent 
from immigration proceedings is that a noncitizen facing a removal hearing 
does not appear before an independent Article III judge, constitutionally 
mandated for criminal court.34 Rather, the hearings are adjudicated before 
an immigration judge within the Department of Justice (DOJ), part of the 
Executive Branch,35 which is simultaneously in charge of enforcement.36  
Finally, another conflict between these two systems is the basic constitu-
tional precept barring criminal penalties imposed ex post facto.37 Under the 
prohibition against ex post facto, a legislative act criminalizing conduct 
must prescribe a possible sentence for its violation.38 While courts have 
consistently held that the ex post facto clause does not to apply to civil 
regulations,39 one could argue that prolonged detention in immigration 
courts or facilities violates this precept. In fashioning a sentence for a crim-
inal violation, a legislature weighs the severity of the proscribed conduct 
against the liberty rights of the violator.40 Therefore, any further incarcera-
tion or penalty would exceed that legislative determination.41 By minimiz-
ing the personal liberty interests and rights of the participants, the system 
continues to exceed the proper punishment for a criminal offense by sup-
                                               
31 Legomsky, supra note 14, at 515–16 n.223–31. 
32 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006). 
33 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“‘[The assistance of counsel] is one of the safe-
guards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liber-
ty.’ Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be as-
sured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”). 
34 Legomsky, supra note 14, at 517. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 509. 
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law . . . "); 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 397 (1798) ("The enhancement of a crime, or penalty, seems to come within 
the same mischief as the creation of a crime of penalty; and therefore they may be classed together.").  
38 Calder, 3 U.S. at 396–97. 
39 Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 81 KY. L.J. 323, 324 
(1993).  
40 See Legomsky, supra note 14, at 519. 
41 Id. 
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plementing detention in the civil proceeding.42  While it is unlikely that 
such penalties will be eliminated wholesale, it is still a relevant considera-
tion in the dehumanization of the noncitizen trapped in the crimmigration 
system.  
B. Legislative Enactments contributing to the Rise of Crimmigration 
The lack of procedural protections becomes increasingly important as the 
immigration system creeps closer to a punitive system, outlined above. Im-
migration violations were first criminalized in the 1920s, when for the first 
time the penalty for an offense such as illegal reentry was not only deporta-
tion, but also a criminal charge and incarceration.43 This process began in 
1929 by making illegal reentry a felony, but such immigration related 
crimes were not heavily prosecuted until the 1980s.44 With the passage of 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),45 the types of 
immigration related offenses with criminal penalties vastly expanded.46  
However, the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)47 marked a tidal change in the inter-
section of criminal and immigration law.48 IIRIRA reshaped the immigra-
tion system with not only by creating new immigration related criminal of-
fenses, but vastly expanding the impact of unrelated criminal convictions on 
immigration status. 49 The passage of this legislation was arguably the true 
beginning of “crimmigration” in the United States.50 With the codification 
of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 and 1227, the grounds for inadmissibility and deporta-
bility formed an incredibly broad scheme of immigration consequences for 
criminal convictions. No longer limited to solely “crimes involving moral 
turpitude” (CIMTs) and a very limited list of aggravated felonies, these two 
                                               
42 See Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (“Detention is a usual feature of every case of ar-
rest on a criminal charge, even when an innocent person is wrongfully accused . . . .”). 
43 Strumpf, supra note 11, at 384; Legomsky, supra note 14, at 487–88; Sklansky, supra note 29, at 157, 
164. 
44 Sklansky, supra note 29, at 164. 
45 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3355 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
46 Legomsky, supra note 14, at 477; see Sklansky, supra note 29, at 165. 
47 Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
48 See Saba Ahmed et al., The Human Cost of IIRIRA—Stories from Individuals Impacted by the Immi-
gration Detention System, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 194 (2017). 
49 Id. at 195 (“IIRIRA’s criminalization of the immigration system has funneled millions of immigrants 
through a massive criminal immigration deportation pipeline”). 
50 Strumpf, supra note 11, at 376, 384; see Yolanda Vazquez, Crimmigration: The Missing Piece of 
Criminal Justice Reform, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 1093, 1114–15 (2017). 
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statutes changed the landscape of immigration and criminal law.51 IIRIRA 
also expanded the list of criminal offenses that trigger mandatory detention, 
which means that once in immigration custody, the noncitizen cannot re-
quest bond.52 Something as minor as possession of a small amount of mari-
juana could trigger this drastic consequence.53 As a direct result of this and 
a few prior similarly purposed laws, “over a twenty-five-year period, from 
1981 through 2005, the number of noncitizens ‘removed’ each year because 
of criminal convictions increased eightyfold [. . .] from just over 500 in 
1981 to more than 40,000 in 2015.”54   
The next step in the crimmigration process is the increasingly punitive 
nature of immigration enforcement resulting from the lack of constitutional 
protections for civil infractions combined with the increase in laws aimed at 
removing noncitizens with criminal convictions.55  By comparison, while 
the constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants are constantly in 
need of protection, their existence is never in question. The fundamental 
rights to counsel, silence, and jury trial, combined with the burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt are all absolutely essential to the system of crim-
inal justice in America. Yet, in immigration court, almost none of these pro-
tections are afforded.56 This is despite the system itself being far more anal-
ogous to a criminal system with detention and penalties than a civil 
regulatory system. As previously stated, “the case for classifying deporta-
tion as punishment becomes strongest when the particular deportation 
grounds are based on criminal convictions or other post-entry conduct—as 
distinguished from those grounds that are linked solely to the original enti-
ties.”57 However, the government and courts largely ignored the criminali-
zation of the immigration system as it became more punitive in nature and 
was fueled by heightened rhetoric surrounding “illegals” and “criminal al-
                                               
51 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 §§ 7342, 7343 (introducing the 
list of aggravated felonies: murder, weapons trafficking, and drug trafficking); Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 § 435; see Legomsky, supra note 
14, at 483; Sklansky, supra note 29, at 175; see also Hernández, supra note 12, at 1351–52. 
52 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2017).  
53 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(i)(II) (2017) (declaring any noncitizen to be inadmissible if they have a convic-
tion for a violation of any law relating to a controlled substance); id. at § 1226(c)(1)(A) (2017) (refer-
encing any noncitizen who “is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in 
[INA] section 212(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)]”). 
54 Sklansky, supra note 29, 178; see MARC R. ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERVICE, R42075, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 
11–12 (2012).  
55 Sklansky, supra note 29, at 181–85; Legomsky, supra note 14, at 487–89. 
56 See supra note 24. 
57 Legomsky, supra note 14, at 488 (relying on Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and 
Punishment: Some Thoughts about Why Hard Cases Make Bad Laws, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1893–
94 (2000)). 
9
Shapiro: The Criminalization of the Immigration System: the Dehumanizing I
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2018
Do Not Delete 3/14/18  8:40 PM 
126 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXI:ii 
iens.”58 In this way, both the legislative enactments and case law combined 
to create and reinforce the crimmigration system. 
C. The Social and Political Evolution of Crimmigration 
The evolution of crimmigration was caused by a variety of social, politi-
cal, and judicial circumstances. Many social scientists posit that immigrants 
were merely swept up in the midst of the “War on Crime” and the “War on 
Drugs” that brought about tough-on-crime policies in the 1980s and 
1990s.59 Others have pointed to links between nationalism and racial preju-
dice.60 As stated by Professor César Cuauhtémoc Garcia Hernández at 
Sturm College of Law, “Immigration imprisonment cannot be characterized 
as nonpunitive. The legislative origins of today’s immigration detention 
system show a desire to punish noncitizens thought to be dangerous to soci-
ety.”61 Prof. Garcia Hernández suggests that such detention is not an acci-
dental consequence of immigration policy, but is rather deeply intertwined 
with racial animus and the War on Drugs.62 Indeed, the legislative efforts 
having the largest impact on crimmigration were often intertwined with an-
ti-drug legislation.63 For example, a string of legislation beginning in 1986 
and culminating in IIRIRA “expanded the government’s immigration deten-
tion authority dramatically and [was] frequently wrapped in legislative con-
text tinged with drug war fervor.”64 With drug enforcement as the gateway, 
“[e]ntry into the criminal justice apparatus for a variety of conduct but es-
pecially drug activity . . . ought to result in entry in to an immigration law 
regime now equipped with detainers and detention.”65  
An additional ill-timed amendment to the immigration system curtailed 
the discretionary-based relief for noncitizens, which previously allowed 
judges in either a criminal or immigration court to mitigate immigration 
consequences.66 One specific remedy was a provision allowing an immigra-
                                               
58 See id. 
59 Strumpf, supra note 11, at 402 (“The rapid importation of criminal grounds into immigration law is 
consistent with a shift in criminal penology from rehabilitation to harsher motivations: retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation, and the expressive power of the state.”); Vazquez, supra note 50, at 1105–06. 
60 Vazquez, supra note 50, at 1107–08; Strumpf, supra note 11, at 408–9, 412; Phillip L. Torrey, Re-
thinking Immigration’s Mandatory Detention Regime: Politics, Profit, and the Meaning of ‘Custody, 48 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879, 883–84, 894–95 (2015). 
61 Hernández, supra note 12, at 1360. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 1362–63. 
64 Id. at 1361–62. 
65 Id. at 1367 (referencing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986)); see 
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DHS FORM I-247, IMMIGRATION 
DETAINER: NOTICE OF ACTION (2012). 
66 Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 
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tion judge to consider various community and family ties, as well as reha-
bilitation and the severity of the crime in not ordering the removal of the 
noncitizen.67 This option for relief was eliminated in 1996.68 Furthermore, 
Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation (JRADs), which allowed 
the criminal sentencing judge to order that the present conviction should not 
be the basis for deportation, were eliminated in 1990.69 “The existence of 
both discretionary tools meant that many individuals convicted of a crime 
could avoid deportation or exclusion. Their repeal, therefore, made it more 
likely these individuals would face removal from their country,” which co-
incided with the vast expansion of grounds for removal in legislation like 
IIRIRA.70 Repealing these discretionary protections dehumanized nonciti-
zen defendants who could no longer have their individual circumstances 
and histories be considered in a court of law. Rather, stark and severe legis-
lative pronouncements limited judicial intervention and reduced immigrants 
to variables within a systematic calculus of statutory consequences.71  
In sum, crimmigration evolved through the classification of immigration 
penalties and detention as part of a civil proceeding, the increased number 
and severity of criminal offenses for immigration violations, the expansion 
of immigration consequences for criminal convictions, and a lack of discre-
tion allowed in the removal proceeding. Crimmigration therefore created a 
pseudo criminal system without the constitutional protections. 
II. INCREASED ENFORCEMENT AND THE IMPACT ON NONCITIZENS 
A. The Rise in Enforcement: The Mechanisms and the Outcome 
The most impactful consequence of the criminalization of the immigra-
tion system is the rise in penalties, referenced above, and the resulting crea-
tion of a complex and ubiquitous enforcement apparatus. This section em-
phasizes the collaboration between local and federal authorities to share 
information and apprehend noncitizens. To truly grasp the magnitude of this 
merger, it is necessary to look to the data and trace the rise in enforcement 
programs, removal orders, and case backlogs. This data reveals the inter-
twining of the two systems over time, as well as bolsters the argument of 
the increasingly punitive nature of the immigration system.  
                                                                                                             
1751, 1761 (2013). 
67 Id. (discussing the former INA § 212(c) relief). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1762; Hernández, supra note 12, at 1377. 
70 Hernández, supra note 12, at 1378–79. 
71 See id. at 1382. 
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In her 2006 article, Professor of Law at Lewis and Clark Law School Ju-
liet Strumpf predicted the outcome of the increasingly criminalized immi-
gration system and incumbent policies.72 Strumpf extrapolated from the 
politics of 2006 and how they would affect the future.73 Beginning with a 
fictional retrospective account, Prof. Strumpf wrote a letter to the President 
in 2017 regarding the “current” state of immigration.74 She wrote, “Depor-
tation became the consequence of almost any criminal conviction of a 
noncitizen, including legal permanent residents.”75 Strumpf also anticipated 
overwhelmed detention centers and reliance on private jails to facilitate the 
“civil” immigration detention.76 She foresaw “the national conversation po-
larized between legalizing the population of undocumented immigrants and 
using the power of the state to crack down on the ‘illegal’ population,” as 
well as the rise in removals, inmates, and backlog in the courts.77 Her pre-
dictions are, as this paper presents, the reality of the immigration enforce-
ment landscape today. 
The rise in federal enforcement comes from bipartisan policy. While 
IRCA and the Immigration Act of 199078 were passed under Republican 
presidents, IIRIRA and AEDPA79 were both passed under a Democratic 
president. Further, since 2000, detention of noncitizens and subsequent re-
moval soared under both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama 
(see Table 1). With regard to enforcement specifically, IRCA arguably 
started the trend as it “blurred the boundary between civil detention and pe-
nal detention by encouraging the confinement of excludable and deportable 
individuals in federal prisons operated by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP).”80  
IRCA also required the U.S. Attorney General to “begin any deportation 
proceeding as expeditiously as possible after the date of conviction,”81 and 
created the Criminal Alien Program (CAP). AEDPA and IIRIRA also esca-
lated criminal enforcement, as the former vastly expanded the number of 
offenses deemed “aggravated felonies,” and the latter introduced “287(g) 
agreements”82 and enabled the “Secure Communities” program, discussed 
                                               
72 Stumpf, supra note 11, at 381. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 368–75. 
75 Id. at 371. 
76 Id. at 373. 
77 Stumpf, supra note 11, at 370. 
78 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. 
79 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
80 Hernández, supra note 12, at 1364. 
81 ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 42, at 11–12. 
82 Hernández, supra note 12, at 1370. 
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below.83 Secure Communities, 287(g), and CAP are all federal programs 
used for “state and local law enforcement to facilitate ICE’s [Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement’s] initiation of removal proceedings against 
noncitizen arrestees.”84 These programs together thus enhanced the ability 
to locate and apprehend noncitizens through local law enforcement coop-
eration.  
Secure Communities is a program allowing data collected by local law 
enforcement, and shared with the U.S. Department of Justice, to then auto-
matically pass to ICE.85 Biometric data, such as fingerprints and other per-
sonal identifying information, is then checked against U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) databases.86 Based on this information, if the 
noncitizen is believed to be removable, a “detainer” is issued.87 This detain-
er is a request to hold the noncitizen for up to 48 hours after the release on 
bail or the conclusion of the criminal case.88 While the legality of this extra-
judicial hold has been successfully challenged,89 detainers are still utilized 
in almost every jurisdiction and emphasize the cooperation between the lo-
cal and federal authorities in information sharing and detention.90  
CAP is a “‘jail-status check’ program[], intended to screen individuals in 
federal, state, or local prisons and jails for removability.”91 CAP was creat-
ed through IRCA by merging the Secure Communities and 287(g) programs 
under the former Immigration and Nationalization Service (later replaced 
                                               
83 Id. 
84 Cade, supra note 66, at 1763. 




88 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2011). 
89 See Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 223 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that ICE must have probable 
cause to effectuate an arrest); Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (hold-
ing that “ICE's issuance of detainers that seek to detain individuals without a warrant goes beyond its 
statutory authority to make warrantless arrests”); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty, No. 3:12-cv-
02317-ST, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50340, at *29 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014) (holding that “continued deten-
tion exceeded the scope of the jail's lawful authority over the released detainee, constituted a new arrest, 
and must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.”); Lunn v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 517, 2017 
WL 3122363 at *519 (2017) (holding that a detainer is civil, not criminal: “nothing in the statutes or 
common law of Massachusetts authorizes court officers to make a civil arrest in these circumstances” 
and therefore any detention past the ordered release on a criminal case is unlawful); see also U.S. Dep't 
of Justice, Office of the Att'y General, Opinion 14-067 (2015) (“It is my opinion that an ICE detainer is 
merely a request . . . For that reason, an adult inmate or a juvenile inmate with a fixed release date 
should be released from custody on that date notwithstanding the agency’s receipt of an ICE detainer.”). 
90 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES: FAQS 
(2017). 
91 The Criminal Alien Program (CAP) Immigration Enforcement in Prisons and Jails, AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL 2 (Aug. 2013), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/cap_fact_sheet_8-1_fin_0.pdf. 
13
Shapiro: The Criminalization of the Immigration System: the Dehumanizing I
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2018
Do Not Delete 3/14/18  8:40 PM 
130 RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW  [Vol. XXI:ii 
by ICE).92 Currently, CAP operates in 100 percent of federal and state 
jails.93 Meanwhile, 287(g) agreements deputize local officers with federal 
arrest power allowing them to arrest noncitizens exclusively for immigra-
tion related offenses.94  
CAP, Secure Communities, and 287(g) agreements dissolved the distinc-
tion between federal and local law enforcement by encouraging or demand-
ing state cooperation.95 IIRIRA also provided the infrastructure for this ex-
pansion by starting a biometric identification database in order to identify 
noncitizens and store their information.96 These programs combined with 
new mandatory detention triggers to create a new issue of housing nonciti-
zens by increasing the numbers of those caught up in the dragnet.97 IIRIRA 
accounted for this, and envisioned new leases and purchases of public and 
private detention centers.98  
Under these programs, immigration status is now relevant from the be-
ginning of the criminal adjudication process.99 During the booking process 
(when an arrestee is taken to a police station and processed), the noncitizen 
is screened by immigration authorities via mechanisms created by all three 
programs.100 At this stage, prior to formal charging, a defendant is not pro-
vided an attorney and typically one has not yet been appointed.101 This con-
cerns immigrants right’s advocates, because CAP agents interview nonciti-
zens without a legal representative to protect the interests of the interviewee 
and ask sensitive immigration related questions, and then the information 
gained is submitted to the DHS databases. This is a fairly routine process, 
as many jails have video teleconference technology within the jail to allow 
for ICE agents to interview arrestees remotely.  
These programs dramatically increased enforcement and the criminaliza-
tion of the immigration system.102 As a result of crimmigration, not only are 
                                               
92 U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FACT SHEET: SECURE 
COMMUNITIES 2 (2008). 
93 WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44627, INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: 
CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAMS 14 (2016). 
94 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2006). 
95 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 54, at 11–12. 
96 Hernández, supra note 12, at 1371. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. 
99 ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 54, at 14. 
100 Id. 
101 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 
175 (1991); U.S. v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)) (holding that the right to counsel “‘does not 
attach until a prosecution is commenced’ . . .  ‘by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indict-
ment, information or arraignment.’”). 
102 ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 54, at 1. 
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noncitizens in immigration detention the most common type of detainee in 
the U.S.,103 but the U.S. also operates the world’s largest immigration de-
tention system.104 First, looking at removal numbers, the number of noncit-
izens apprehended and removed rose by about 8,000 percent between 1925 
and 2000, as depicted in Table 1.105 Although steadily increasing over time, 
the numbers of individuals subject to the immigration system ballooned af-
ter the previously discussed legislation and policy changes in the 20th cen-
tury.106 By 1990, apprehension and deportation numbers broke one mil-
lion.107 Just 10 years later, in 2000, the numbers almost doubled to over 1.8 
million, the apex.108 Next, looking at the numbers of noncitizens deemed 
“criminal aliens” (those in removal proceedings who have prior criminal of-
fenses—regardless of status or type of offense) in Table 2 below, the pat-
tern displayed between 1995 and 2015 is stark. Table 2 reveals important 
information both on the inaccuracy of public perception, as well as the dras-
tic increase in removals.109 
These data show two essential points to understanding the rise of crim-
migration. First, although removals peaked in 2010, removals skyrocketed 
prior to that time.110 Removals in 1995 totaled 50,924 people, including 
criminal and non-criminal.111 In 2010, the total was 381,525, or over a sev-
enfold increase.112 By 2015, the total decreased slightly to 333,341.113 Sec-
ond, despite common rhetoric, non-criminals consistently comprise substan-
tially more than half of all removals.114 Thus, the majority of noncitizens in 
the immigration removal system do not have any criminal convictions. Po-
litically speaking, it is common to highlight the growing use of the immi-
gration system for apprehending so-called criminals, yet statistically speak-
                                               
103 Hernández, supra note 12, at 1382. 
104 Ahmed et al., supra note 48, at 194. 
105 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, TABLE 33 (2015); id. 
at TABLE 39 (Here, deportation includes both returns and removals, which includes both those who have 
been removed based on an order of removal, as well as those who have been released by other mecha-
nisms) [hereinafter DHS YEARBOOK 2015]. 
106 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3355; Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; ROSENBLUM & 
KANDEL, supra note 54, at 14; Hernández, supra note 12, at 1382. 
107 DHS YEARBOOK 2015. 
108 Id. 
109 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGR. AND NATURALIZATION SERV., STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, TABLE 63 (1999) [hereinafter DOJ YEARBOOK 1999]; 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, TABLE 41 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter DHS YEARBOOK 2005]; DHS YEARBOOK 2015, at TABLE 41. 
110 See DHS YEARBOOK 2015, at TABLE 41. 
111 DOJ YEARBOOK 1999, at TABLE 63. 
112 DHS YEARBOOK 2015, at TABLE 41. 
113 Id. 
114 See id.; DOJ YEARBOOK 1999, at TABLE 63; DHS YEARBOOK 2005, at TABLE 41. 
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ing that is inaccurate.115 Further, even of those noncitizens who have a 
criminal record, an “in-house report prepared by ICE revealed that, of the 
aliens held on September 1, 2009, 34 percent were not subject to mandatory 
detention and 49 percent were not felons; only 11 percent had committed 
[sic] violent offenses.”116 While this is a snapshot, it shows that even of 
those deemed “criminal aliens,” the vast majority have not committed a vio-
lent offense, and one-third did not even have a conviction sufficient to trig-
ger the very low mandatory detention grounds.117 
The final measurement revealing the explosion of the crimmigration sys-
tem is the resulting debilitating rise in caseload. This can be shown in two 
comparative charts that look at pending cases and average days to adjudi-
cate those cases (Tables 3 and 4).118 Pending cases count the number of 
pending immigration proceedings open at any given time.119 Average days 
are counted based on the average length of time a case is open during pro-
ceedings.120 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) summarized: 
“Our analysis of EOIR’s [Executive Office of Immigration Review] annual 
immigration court system caseload—the number of open cases before the 
court during a single fiscal year—showed that it grew 44 percent from fiscal 
years 2006 through 2015 due to an increase in the case backlog.”121 Based 
on this backlog, some cases pending on the non-detained docket are now 
scheduled as far out as July of 2022 for adjudication.122 Combined, these 
data paint a clear picture: every measurement relating to enforcement and 
penalty in the immigration system has vastly increased over time, specifi-
cally since the crimmigration legislative boom of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
                                               
115 See id. 
116 Sklansky, supra note 29, 184–85. 
117 See id. 
118 Immigration Court Backlog, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE AT SYRACUSE 
UNIV. (2017) http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/. 
119 About the Data, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE AT SYRACUSE UNIV. (2011), 
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/about_data.html. 
120 Id. 
121 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS, ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL 
CHALLENGES 1, 20 (2017). 
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B. “Illegals” and “Criminal Aliens:” How the Rise in Enforcement and the 
Criminalization of the Immigration System Dehumanized Noncitizens 
in the Political Sphere 
This criminalization of the immigration system had simultaneous effects 
from a sociological standpoint, and the term “criminal alien” as well as the 
colloquial term “illegals,” reflects those effects.123 The terminology has 
concrete consequences in the legal limitation of human rights based on the 
classification of immigration as a civil, rather than criminal system.124 More 
provocatively stated, “the term ‘criminal alien’ [is] a strategic sleight of 
hand. These laws established the concept of ‘criminal alienhood’ that has 
slowly but purposefully redefined what it means to be unauthorized in the 
United States such that criminality and unauthorized status are too often 
considered synonymous.”125 Similarly, the term constitutes a “psychosocial 
dehumanization of immigrants as disposable, threatening, and categorically 
excludable.”126  
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines an “alien” is “any 
person not a citizen or national of the United States.”127 The term “criminal 
alien,” while not defined by INA, is used by the government to refer generi-
cally to those noncitizens convicted of a crime and builds on the concept of 
separating and dehumanizing noncitizens.128 This term is used regardless of 
the noncitizen’s immigration status or the severity of the offense, including 
any minor traffic offense.129 The term “illegals” used in common parlance 
refers to those noncitizens who either entered without inspection, or are cur-
rently without proper documentation.130 This conflation of the idea of the 
“other” with criminality is not an accident, and it causes separations within 
society.131 Both the immigration and criminal systems heavily employ this 
                                               
123 See Leisy Abrego, et al., Making Immigrants into Criminals: Legal Processes of Criminalization in 
the Post-IIRIRA Era, 5 J. MIGRATION & HUM. SOC’Y 694, 702 (2017). 
124 See id. at 697. 
125 See id. at 695. 
126 Ahmed et al., supra note 48, at 214. 
127 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2017). 
128 Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1140 (2013); ROSENBLUM & KANDEL, supra note 54, at 41 (defining “‘criminal 
alien’ as a noncitizen who has been convicted of a crime in the United States” . . . “Despite its wide-
spread use, no consistent definition of the term ‘criminal alien’ exists.”). 
129 Eagly, supra note 128, at 1140–41. 
130 Vazquez, supra note 50, at 1115. 
131 See Stumpf, supra note 11, at 397 (“Membership theory influences immigration and criminal law in 
similar ways. Membership theory is based in the idea that positive rights arise from a social contract 
between the government and the people. Those who are not parties to that agreement and yet are subject 
to government action have no claim to such positive rights, or rights equivalent to those held by mem-
bers.”). 
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terminology while they “act as gatekeepers of membership in our society, 
determining whether an individual should be included in or excluded.”132  
Those who are excluded are then deprived of those rights which are granted 
based on “a social contract between the government and the [included] peo-
ple.”133  
Furthering this separation, the public often associates immigration gener-
ally with illegal immigration specifically, and higher criminality rates.134 In 
Prof. Strumpf’s article, she rightly predicted, “changes in the law fed a 
powerful vision of the immigrant as a scofflaw and a criminal that began to 
dominate the competing image of the benign, hard-working embodiment of 
the American dream.”135 Due to crimmigration, “[n]o longer were [immi-
grants] seen as those who arrived for a better life, to work hard and contrib-
ute to society, but instead they were increasingly viewed as those who came 
to the United States to commit crimes and endanger the safety of the na-
tion.”136 This is subconsciously reflected and reinforced by the fact that the 
predecessor to ICE, INS, was moved out of the Department of Justice and 
into the Department of Homeland Security, whose mission is primarily to 
fight terrorism in the wake of September 11, 2001.  Further, this shift im-
plied that the immigration system is not part of a broader, justice-and-rule-
based system, but instead specifically designed to target immigrants who 
are now broadly associated with criminality and terrorism.137 The use of 
“criminal alien” and “illegals” coincides with the move of ICE to DHS, and 
serves to further dehumanize the noncitizen population in the eyes of the 
public.138 History shows that the use of such terminology paved the way for 
the restriction and limitation of the rights of those noncitizens caught up in 
this fervor.139 Strumpf’s prediction could not be more accurate given the 
nationalistic rhetoric displayed in the 2016 presidential election, and in-
creased enforcement in 2017, discussed in the conclusion below. 
 
                                               
132 Id. at 396–97. 
133 Id. 
134 Legomsky, supra note 14, at 508. 
135 Stumpf, supra note 11, at 371. 
136 Vazquez, supra note 50, at 1115–16. 
137 See id. 
138 See id. 
139 See Stumpf, supra note 11, at 397. 
18
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss2/10
Do Not Delete 3/14/18  8:40 PM 
2018] CRIMINALIZATION OF THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 135 
III. IMPACT OF CRIMMIGRATION ON CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
The expansion of crimmigration hit a speed bump with the Supreme 
Court of the United State’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky in 2010.140 By 
recognizing the devastating impact of deportation and immigration conse-
quences, the decision momentarily validated the humanity of noncitizens.141 
However, the decision reaffirmed that despite the criminal-like consequenc-
es, the immigration system is still classified as civil, not criminal. This sec-
tion explains the impact of this decision on criminal defense of immigrants, 
specifically in Virginia. It also discusses the marginalization of noncitizens 
bolstered by terms such as “illegal alien,” which arguably result in a multi-
tude of inequities for immigrants and noncitizens in the criminal justice sys-
tem.  
Padilla v. Kentucky required the Court to address the consequence of 
crimmigration, namely, the lack of notice or advisal of the immigration 
consequences in the confines of a criminal prosecution.142 In Padilla, the 
Court evaluated the history of the increasing severity of the immigration 
system stating that “[t]hese changes to our immigration law have dramati-
cally raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”143 The Court 
recognized that legislative changes referenced in Part I altered the calculus 
for whether the immigration consequence was so integral to the criminal 
case that it must be incorporated into the standard for evaluating the effec-
tive assistance of counsel.144 The Court writes, “The importance of accurate 
legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more im-
portant” and most surprising, “as a matter of federal law, deportation is an 
integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty 
that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified 
crimes.”145 Despite this recognition, the Court upheld the criminal/civil dis-
tinction, stating that “although removal proceedings are civil in nature, de-
portation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal process”146 and 
further “deportation is a particularly severe penalty, but it is not, in a strict 
sense, a criminal sanction.”147  Still, the inclusion of immigration conse-
quences as part of the criminal penalty, and the holding that counsel must 
                                               
140 Dorothy A. Harbeck, M. Michelle Park & Yoonji Kim, The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on the 
Immigration Courts: Does the Potential for Vacating a Criminal Plea Effect Removal/Deportation Pro-
ceedings?, 1 J. INT'L & COMP. L. 66, 68 (2010). 
141 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373–74. 
142 Id. at 364. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 360–64. 
145 Id. at 364. 
146 Padilla, 559 U.S.at 365. 
147 Id. 
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advise regarding those consequences, marked a sea-change in the field of 
criminal defense. As the court stated, “[i]t is quintessentially the duty of 
counsel to provide her client with available advice about an issue like de-
portation,” remarked the Court.148 
The burden of this new legal obligation fell largely on court-appointed 
attorneys and public defenders.149 However, fully understanding the com-
plexity of immigration law, not only on an academic level, but at a level 
sufficient to advise a client about the possibly life altering consequences, is 
daunting to say the least. Those consequences in immigration court are then 
doled out without the benefit of appointed counsel.150 This leaves court-
appointed attorneys in the criminal case to attempt to fill the void and ad-
vise clients about the penalties in both systems.151 This incredibly difficult 
burden to bear is a direct result of the criminalization of the immigration 
process and puts noncitizen defendants at a disadvantage.152 Despite the 
Supreme Court clearly holding that the failure to advise clients regarding 
the immigration consequences of a criminal charge is ineffective assistance 
of counsel,153 this required practice is not universally employed. Overbur-
dened with high caseloads, it is difficult for criminal defense attorneys to 
obtain the necessary training to properly advise their clients.154 Even for 
those attorneys fortunate enough to receive adequate training and the assis-
tance of pro bono immigration attorneys, the far reaching consequences are 
almost impossible to account for. Thus, “[d]efendants who lack competent 
counsel, or any attorney at all, will not be aware of the immigration conse-
quences of guilty pleas to petty charges. Even when defendants have 
knowledgeable counsel, effective plea bargains and acquittals are difficult 
to achieve.”155  
Beyond the penalties in the immigration system, the increasing hardship 
suffered by noncitizens in the criminal justice system is pervasive and insid-
ious. Coinciding with the dehumanization of noncitizens and the confluence 
of immigration and illegality, prejudices have developed throughout the 
process. At every step of the criminal justice process, from bond determina-
tions to plea-bargaining to even sentencing, noncitizens face numerous ob-
stacles to justice.156 As discussed previously, beginning with booking, 
                                               
148 Id. at 371. 
149 See Ahmed et al., supra note 48, at 195–96. 
150 See id. at 196. 
151 Id. 
152 See id. at 195–96. 
153 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985)). 
154 See Ahmed et al., supra note 48, at 196. 
155 Cade, supra note 66, at 1796. 
156 See id. at 1751; Abrego, et al., supra note 123; Vazquez, supra note 50, at 1093. 
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noncitizens are subject to an interview without counsel, which can result in 
an immigration detainer through Secure Communities and CAP.157 Prior to 
being formally arraigned for a criminal offense, noncitizens are questioned 
by ICE, have their fingerprints sent to DHS, and possibly have a detainer 
issued against them.158 Thus, the immigrant is not only subject to the crimi-
nal procedure, but the outside influence of the federal government.  
Once formally charged, a magistrate or judge must determine if the ar-
restee should be released or issued a bond amount to secure their bail.159 
Their decision is often influenced by the arrestee’s immigration status.160 
For the author’s clients, the issue of whether a client has an immigration de-
tainer if often at the forefront of a judge’s mind while making a bond de-
termination. Some judges refuse to issue a bond to someone with a detainer 
fearing that the noncitizen would be taken by ICE and never return to court 
to be held responsible for the criminal offense. Other judges issue a height-
ened bond reasoning that an immigration detainer indicates a risk of flight. 
Further, there is a presumption against bond in cases where a noncitizen is 
charged with certain felony or other enumerated misdemeanor offenses, in-
cluding driving under the influence, if they are “identified as being illegally 
present.”161  
Many scholars document this phenomenon.162 Jurisdictions regularly 
take into account the defendant’s immigration status when determining bail, 
usually as a factor relating to risk of flight.163 While it may be relevant if 
the arrestee newly arrived in the country and lacks community ties, for a 
noncitizen who has family and community connections and has made a life 
in the U.S., immigration status has little bearing on risk of flight.164 Courts, 
however, have upheld immigration status as a lawful factor in bail deci-
sions.165 Further, even in cases where a noncitizen is granted a bond, his or 
her unknown or undocumented immigration status may lead to prohibitively 
                                               
157 See Eagly, supra note 128, at 1148–49. 
158 See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2017). 
159 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120 (2017). 
160 Lena Graber & Amy Schnitzer, The Bail Reform Act and Immigration Custody for Federal Criminal 
Defendants, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD 5 (2013), 
https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/crim/2013_Jun_federal-
bail.pdf. 
161 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120.1 (2017). 
162 See Cade, supra note 66, at 1791–92 (comparing state policies regarding the consideration of immi-
gration status when determining bail); Eagly, supra note 128, at 1150 (detailing the corresponding diffi-
culty if the noncitizen is given a bond in immigration court but not released therefrom); Vazquez, supra 
note 50, at 1126–27 (outlining ways in which immigration status has been used to deny bail). 
163 Cade, supra note 66, at 1791; Chin, supra note 30, at 1423–24. 
164 Chin, supra note 30, at 1450. 
165 Cade, supra note 66, at 1791. 
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expensive bonds or the refusal of bond companies to secure that bond.166 
The result of an inability to obtain or pay a bond results in extended incar-
ceration pending trial and in sentencing.167 
While a case is pending, immigration status continues to play a key role, 
particularly if the noncitizen remains detained. Detained defendants are 
generally more likely to plead guilty, which can occur at a bond motion for 
minor offenses in some jurisdictions.168 Regarding less serious criminal of-
fenses, “facing prohibitively high bond, delay, repeated court appearances, 
and other process costs, most misdemeanor defendants submit to institu-
tional pressures to plead guilty at the earliest opportunity.”169 Further, if the 
client does not have a detainer, there is a perverse incentive to plead guilty 
quickly and ignore the immigration consequences to avoid immediate ICE 
apprehension.170 Pleading guilty forecloses any legal or constitutional de-
fenses that may have arisen in the criminal court proceedings.171 Unfortu-
nately, the crimmigration system creates the “danger that fear or ignorance 
will skew innocent defendants’ bargaining,” leading an innocent client to 
make an uninformed choice in order to avoid ICE apprehension.172  
Another aspect of the plea bargaining process is prosecutor involvement. 
Although the Supreme Court in Padilla envisioned immigration conse-
quences would be considered in the plea bargaining process, in practice this 
is difficult to effectuate.173 Prosecutors are often reluctant to take immigra-
tion status into account, either because these considerations could constitute 
an unfair advantage to noncitizens or because they believe that mitigating 
the immigration consequences is not their concern.174 In many jurisdictions, 
including Virginia, any criminal defendant is only entitled to an attorney if 
there is a possibility of incarceration.175 The prosecutor can waive any jail 
time on an offense,176 which is commonplace for minor offenses, thus re-
moving the right to appointed counsel. However, this leaves noncitizens 
without the right to a court-appointed attorney to help them navigate both 
the criminal charges and the immigration consequences.177 Thus, the “Pa-
                                               
166 Id. at 1801. 
167 Id. at 1792. 
168 Id. at 1792–93. 
169 Id. at 1754. 
170 Cade, supra note 66, at 1797. 
171 Id. at 1797. 
172 Id. at 1804. 
173 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373. 
174 Ahmed et al., supra note 48, at 197–98; see Eagly, supra note 119, at 1151–52. 
175 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-160 (2017); Kapoor v. Commonwealth, No. 2582-03-4, 2004 Va. App. 
LEXIS 557, at *1, *3 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2004). 
176 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-160. 
177 Memorandum, ARLINGTON CTY BAR ASS'N (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.arlnow.com/wp-
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dilla Court’s assumption that the parties will bargain for deportation-
avoiding dispositions is least likely to occur precisely where the rift be-
tween the gravity of the criminal offense and the ensuring deportation con-
sequence is the largest,” as the bargaining process and full representation is 
least likely to occur in minor offenses.178 If noncitizens choose to go to tri-
al, they may face certain structural inequalities. In some jurisdictions, un-
lawful entry or status can be used as grounds to impeach a witness or the 
accused.179 Impeachment is permitted based on the assumption that unlaw-
ful entry or expired status is a “bad act probative of dishonesty,” and thus 
bears on the credibility of the witness or accused similar to a prior criminal 
conviction.180 Alternatively, unlawful status may create a bias against the 
defendant in favor of the government.181 In sum, the willingness to conflate 
immigration status with dishonesty and criminal activity further dehuman-
izes noncitizen defendants, and solidifies the links between foreign heritage, 
illegality, and untrustworthiness.  
Whether through a plea agreement or juror’s decision, immigration status 
infiltrates the sentencing stage as well.182 In light of Padilla, it is an ethical 
practice to reference the possible immigration consequences of defendants 
at sentencing.183 However, immigration status can adversely affect nonciti-
zens at this stage as well.184 Statutorily, a suspended sentence on a fairly 
minor offense can be considered an aggravated felony if the suspended sen-
tence is 365 days or more.185 To avoid these triggers, attorneys often ask for 
active jail time with a shorter suspended sentence, even for clients with 
probation guidelines who typically would never see the inside of a jail.186 
Thus, noncitizens may spend time in jail in order to avoid immigration con-
sequences even though the penalty is inappropriate for the criminal case. 
Still, arguing to avoid a particular sentence is not guaranteed to sway judg-
                                                                                                             
content/uploads/2017/03/Waiver-of-Jail-Time-ACBA-Memo.pdf; Rachel Weiner, Get Caught with Pot, 
Don’t Go to Jail: Why Not Everyone is Happy, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/get-caught-with-pot-dont-go-to-jail-why-not-
everyone-is-happy/2017/03/09/81c0e6a6-fecb-11e6-8ebe-6e0dbe4f2bca_story.html. 
178 Cade, supra note 66, at 1775. 
179 Chin, supra note 30, at 1426–27. 
180 Id. at 1427–28. 
181 Id. at 1427. 
182 Eagly, supra note 128, at 1154. 
183 IMMIGRATION DEF. PROJECT & N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, JUDICIAL 
OBLIGATIONS AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN UPHOLDING DEFENDANT’S 
RIGHTS TO ADVICE ABOUT THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 24 (2011). 
184 Id. 
185 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and (G) (2017). 
186 See Chin, supra note 30, at 1436. 
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es. Some think citizens and noncitizens should be treated equally in a crim-
inal case, and the immigration consequences are thereby irrelevant.187 
Disturbingly, immigration status can also be taken into account for de-
termining sentence lengths and penalties. This can be created by biases on 
the bench, but may also be statutorily authorized.188 Whether through im-
plicit bias or statutory construction, studies show that noncitizens are more 
likely to be incarcerated and have longer sentences than U.S. citizens.189 
Many states even specifically allow for a longer sentence based solely on 
unlawful entry, because it is considered to indicate a “disregard for the 
law.”190  
Additionally, in criminal sentencing, there are often statutory alternatives 
to incarceration, including probation, work release, house arrest, and drug 
treatment programs.191 Immigration status is permitted to be a determining 
factor in whether to allow a defendant to take advantage of these rehabilita-
tive programs.192 If they are not sentenced to active jail time, probation may 
still present risks for noncitizens, such as ICE involvement and apprehen-
sion.193 Consequently, noncitizens may not be able to avail themselves to 
all the remedies available by law, based solely on their immigration status. 
Finally, even if the noncitizen can partake in an alternative criminal disposi-
tion, often rehabilitation programs allowing defendants to avoid conviction 
can trigger immigration consequences.194 This perpetuates the dehumaniza-
tion of noncitizens in the crimmigration system as their rights are restricted 
at every stage of the criminal justice process. 
CONCLUSION 
Words matter. How we define and discuss people and groups affects 
their most fundamental rights and how they are impacted by policy. By de-
claring an entire group of people to be “illegal,” society has allowed federal 
and local governments to perpetuate the logical fallacy that the immigration 
system is merely civil regulation and therefore those subject to it are not en-
titled to procedural protection. This fallacy, created by defining people 
based on their status rather than their human dignity, has stripped millions 
                                               
187 See id. at 1443. 
188 See, e.g., id. at 1431. 
189 Vazquez, supra note 50, at 1127. 
190 See Chin, supra note 30, at 1432–33 n.80–92. 
191 Id. at 1430. 
192 Id. 
193 Eagly, supra note 128, at 1154–55 n. 106 and n.9; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294.2 (2017).. 
194 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2017); Jaquez v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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of people of the most basic rights of our Constitution195 The negative stere-
otypes of noncitizens and immigrants bolstered over the past 50 years 
through legislation and “tough on crime” policies created a punitive and de-
humanizing immigration system. These stereotypes must be dismantled to 
evaluate honestly the current state of crimmigration in the United States.  
During President Obama’s second term, there was some cause for hope 
with regard to enforcement. At the end of 2014, President Obama began the 
Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), at the direction of former DHS Secre-
tary Jeh Johnson.196 PEP utilized prosecutorial discretion to prioritize only 
those noncitizens without proper documentation who committed certain 
types of crimes for enforcement.197 The goal was to apprehend only those 
noncitizens who violated the law.198 Under this program, demonstrated in 
Table 1, removals and apprehensions declined.199  By the end of 2016,  
98 percent of initial enforcement actions . . . involved individuals classified 
within one of the three enforcement priority categories. Ninety-one percent 
were among the top priority (Priority 1), which includes national security 
threats, individuals apprehended at the border while attempting to enter unlaw-
fully, and the most serious categories of convicted criminals as well as gang 
members.200  
 
Along with PEP, President Obama also instituted the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in 2012.201 This program utilized 
prosecutorial discretion in order to protect noncitizens without documenta-
tion who were brought to the United States as children, referred to as 
“Dreamers,” based on the name of prior legislation.202 The program pro-
tected recipients from deportation proceedings and authorized them to 
                                               
195 Daniel Fisher, Does the Constitution Protect Noncitizens? Judges Say Yes., FORBES (Jan. 30, 2017, 
12:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2017/01/30/does-the-constitution-protect-
noncitizens-judges-say-yes/#5d46af274f1d. 
196 Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. (2017), https://www.ice.gov/pep. 
The contents of this page no longer reflect the Department's policies. 
197 Id. 
198 Eyder Peralta, Obama Goes It Alone, Shielding up to 5 Million Immigrants from Deportation, NPR 
(Nov. 20, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/20/365519963/obama-will-
announce-relief-for-up-to-5-million-immigrants. 
199 See DHS YEARBOOK 2015, at TABLE 33; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ALIENS APPREHENDED: 
FISCAL YEARS 1925 TO 2015 (2016). 
200 DHS Releases End of Fiscal Year 2016 Statistics, DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/dhs-releases-end-fiscal-year-2016-statistics. 
201 Julia Preston & John H. Cushman Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES (Jun. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-
immigrants.html. 
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work.203 PEP and DACA benefit from positive and humanizing terms, fo-
cusing on protecting families and dreamers. Instead of deporting families, 
they support “dreamers.” 
However, these programs were eliminated by President Donald 
Trump.204 Noncitizen arrests increased 38 percent in the first half of 
2017.205 This includes roughly 65 percent of the population previously pro-
tected under the PEP.206 The number of detainers issued also increased 75 
percent in 2017.207 Looking forward, the Acting Director of ICE stated the 
“abolishment of the Priority Enforcement Program and re-establishment of 
the Secure Communities program, combined with the expansion of the 
287(g)2 [sic] program, is expected to result in significant increases to inte-
rior apprehensions and removals.”208 Of those affected by this change in 
policy, “nearly 60 percent arrived in the U.S. before 2000 and one third 
have been here for more than 20 years. Eight million of the 11 million have 
jobs. They make up 5 percent of the country’s labor force, mostly in agri-
culture, construction and the hospitality industry.”209 As indicated above, 
the majority of those in removal proceedings do not have a criminal rec-
ord.210 Additionally, the rescission of DACA exposes 800,000 law abiding 
and educated young people to removal.211 These policy changes are swift 
and impactful with even veteran DHS officers questioning the increased en-
forcement.212  
With the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, the crimmigration 
trend is surely to continue. However, if the media and the government stop 
                                               
203 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV., CONSIDERATION FOR 
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) (2017). 
204 For DACA rescission, see U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, RESCISSION 
OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) (2017); for PEP rescission, see U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, EXECUTIVE ORDER: ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY IN 
THE INTERIOR OF THE UNITED States (2017). 
205 Immigration and Customs Enforcement & Customs and Border Protection FY18 Budget Request: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. 
(2017) (statement of of U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Act-
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211 Royce Murray, Six Months of Immigration Enforcement Under the New Administration, Am. Im-
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using terms such as “illegals” to define an entire group of people, perhaps a 
more humane system can take root. Rather than dehumanizing noncitizens, 
immigration reform can reverse the crimmigration trend and separate the 
two systems. For example, the use of the terms “families” and “dreamers” 
was accompanied by decreased enforcement and decreased criminal and 
immigration penalties.213 Some hope still exists for dreamers after the re-
scission of DACA. Multiple pieces of legislation at the federal and state 
level are being introduced with the intent of protecting and humanizing 
young people without protected status.214 The first step toward encouraging 
a fair and humane system is changing the way the debate is framed. Until 
the terms of the debate are changed, it will be difficult to begin meaningful 
discussion.  
Noncitizens are people. They are neighbors, coworkers, and friends. 
They are not inherently “illicit or morally wrong” simply by virtue of not 
being born in the United States.215 They are not so different in their nature 
that they are incompatible with American identity, as the term “alien” sug-
gests.216 In conclusion, until the humanity of noncitizens is recognized, the 











                                               
213 See Tables 1 and 2. 
214 The Dream Act, DACA, and Other Policies Designed to Protect Dreamers, AM. IMMIGRATION 
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215 Criminal, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2017); Illegal, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 
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